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1. INTRODUCTION

Taxpayer A wants to sell an asset to C. Taxpayer A also
wants to minimize his tax liability on the income derived from
the sale of the asset to C. Taxpayer A, therefore, first sells the
asset to a related person B, with B in turn selling the asset to
C. This structure, through which A minimizes his tax liability
by using B as a conduit, is known as a "linear transaction."
How should tax systems respond to such multi-step
schemes of a taxpayer in carrying out a transaction which is
designed to minimize his income tax liability? Can the
taxpayer's right of tax planning be reconciled with the
treasury's right and duty to protect the collection of taxes and
preserve the integrity of the tax system? When are the tax
authorities justified in treating the above transaction as a
single integrated sales transaction from A to C?
This is an old dilemma with no clear answer given by any
modern tax system. Nevertheless, it is instructive to follow
the responses of a few tax systems which share common
principles and offer sensible guidelines. This Article focuses
on three such tax systems, those of the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Israel,' all of which have complex

"All Israeli case law and statutory tax provisions have been translated
and verified by the author and not the University of PennsylvaniaJournal
of InternationalBusiness Law.
""Professor of Tax and Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv
University; LL.B., LL.M., 1969, Hebrew University; LL.M., S.J.D., 1972,
University of Michigan. I wish to thank Professors John K. McNulty and
Stanley Siegel for their valuable comments. I am also grateful to the
University of California at Berkeley, School of Law, and the Center for the
Study of Law and Society for their kind hospitality during my time as a
Visiting Scholar in the Summer of 1993.
1 For a major survey of Israeli tax law, see Yitzhak Hadari, Tax Law in
INTRODUCTION TO ISRAELI LAW (A. Shapira ed. forthcoming (1994)
(Introduction to the World Laws (Kluwer, forthcoming (1994))); Amnon
Rafael, Business Operation in Israel, Tax Management Foreign Income
Portfolios, (BNA) No. 967 (1990). As a short introduction, the current
Israeli statute is called the Income Tax Ordinance of 1947 with an Israeli
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tax statutes in addition to vast bodies of case law based on
well established common law doctrines. The courts in the
legal systems analyzed react in a like manner, even though the
terminology and tax doctrines employed are different.
This Article proceeds from the basic premise that in all
three legal systems, the taxpayer's use of a linear transaction
is not criminal since it does not violate the tax law. Therefore,
the question becomes whether the transaction is accepted as
a legitimate form of tax planning or avoidance, or whether it
is "inoperative" for taxation purposes.2 An "inoperative" tax
avoidance scheme is one in which the steps that are taken are
interrelated and, in fact, represent a single economic
transaction for taxation purposes.'
In addition, the various tax statutes do not contain a
specific anti-avoidance provision with respect to the type of
transaction under consideration. 4 The three tax systems also
New Version of 1961 [hereinafter The Ordinance]. The Ordinance was
introduced by the British during their international "Mandate" over then
Palestine. The Ordinance was an adaptation of a model income tax statute
drafted by the British for the enactment of income tax statutes in their
colonies and "mandates." The Ordinance has continued in force in Israel
since 1948. It was based on British concepts and common law principles but
differed in its basic structure and many of its provisions. Following many
Israeli amendments, a New Version was adopted in 1961 (Israel Laws, New
Versions 120), and, since then, more than ninety amendments have been
adopted. Israeli case law and tax theories were influenced by British tax
law and until some two to three decades ago they had binding interpretory
power. Since then British tax law has served as persuasive authority to be
utilized over all sources of tax law, including U.S. case law, when
interpreting a given statutory provision. Israel's current approach for
interpreting a statutory tax provision is similar to interpreting any nonfiscal statute, and is based on the proper legislative purpose or intent in its
broadest sense. See Kibbutz Hazor v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 165/82, 39(2)
P.D. 70.
2

E.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
4.3.2, at 4-28 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993)

("Although the terms are occasionally used interchangeably, 'tax avoidance'
and 'tax evasion' are usually differentiated-the former phrase denoting
noncriminal modes of minimizing or avoiding tax liability; the latter,
fraudulent behavior.").
' The taxpayer might have disguised the real economic substance of the
transaction, but the assumption is that he gave full disclosure of all relevant
facts and did not attempt to commit fraud. Id.
' For examples see I.R.C. §§ 269, 382, 482 (1986); see also Israeli Tax
Ordinance §§ 82-85 (addressing taxation ofincome from the sale of stock not
sold through an arms length transaction, assignment of income to minors,
and other assignment of income transactions through which a taxpayer can
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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share common tax concepts in this area in the sense that the
taxpayer is entitled, subject to various tax avoidance doctrines,
to structure a transaction in a form that would require the
payment of less taxes than another equally available form.5
However, if the transaction is structured only to avoid
taxation, then the systems would tax the transaction
regardless of the form selected, a result that is consistent with
the meaning and statutory intent of the applicable tax provision.'
sold through an arms length transaction, assignment of income to minors,
and other assignment of income transactions through which a taxpayer can
attempt to lessen his tax liability).
' For U.S. authorities, see Judge Learned Hand writing for the court in
Helvering v. Gregory:
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does
not lose its immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or,
if one chose, to evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs
that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose
that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a
patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd sub noma., Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935). In another opinion, Judge Learned Hand also stated:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister
in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible.
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes
any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more
in the name of morals is mere cant.
Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (dissenting
opinion), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947).
Lord Tomlin of the House of Lords similarly held in Inland Revenue
Comm'rs v. Duke of Westminster:
Every man is entitled, if he can, to order his affairs so that the tax
attaching under the appropriate acts is less than it otherwise would
be. If he succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then
however unappreciative the commissioners of Inland Revenue or his
fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be compelled to
pay an increased tax.
[1935] All E.R. 259, 267.
Similarly, Justice Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court used the phrase
"legitimate tax planning" in Kahn v. Director of Land Appreciation Tax, C.A.
389/82, 39(1) P.D. 794, 796; see also Justice Vitkon's holding in Director of
Land Appreciation Tax v. Tamir, C.A. 262/65, 20(1) P.D. 695, 699-700.
6 See, e.g., United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168 (1921); Weiner't
Est. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961); Helvering v.
Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811; Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1957). Judge Learned Hand dissented in Gilbert stating:
It is a corollary of the universally accepted canon of interpretation
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The three tax systems also share similar canons of
statutory construction. That is, that tax statutes are not
interpreted on the mere basis of the letter of the law,' but
rather, in accordance with the proper statutory intent. Such
statutory intent is sometimes referred to, particularly in U.S.
writings, as "tax policy."8 However, the U.K. and Israeli
courts are more cautious in using the term "tax policy" in this
context. In order to avoid the usurpation of the legislature's
role by the courts,' the latter two will title judge-made law
"judicial legislation " as opposed to "tax policy." In any
event, the outcome of the three legal systems ought to be
similar, since each system shares exactly the same dilemma
with no unique characteristics to any of them that would

specify all the occasions they are meant to cover.
Id. at 411.
Lord Wilberforce in W. T Ramsay, Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs
quoted from Judge Hand's dissent in Gilbert, see Ramsay, [1981] 2 W.L.R.
at 459-60.
The opinion in Gilbert was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960).. See Marvin A.
Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77
YALE L.J. 440, 472 (1968); see also Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423,
451 (Lord Oliver stating that "[als a matter of construction of the statute,
the court has ascertained that which has taken place is not, within the
meaning of the statute. ... ").

" See supra note 6 in general (including the Gilbert quotation) and
Chirelstein, supra note 6, at 472-73, in particular. For the Israeli approach
to statutory construction of tax law, see Justice Barak's opinion in Kibbutz
Hazor v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 165/82, 39(2) P.D. 70.
' See Walter J. Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income
Taxation, 344 CHI. L. REV. 485, 535-36 (1967); see also Ronald H. Jensen,
Form And Substance: Tax-Free IncorporationAnd Other Transactions
Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 425 (1991).

' Lord Jauncey states in White:
I conclude my analysis ...

by emphasizing that the Ramsay

principle is a principle of construction, that it does not entitle the
courts to legislate against specific acts of tax avoidance where
Parliament has not done so and that at the end of the day the
question will always be whether the event or combination of events
relied on amount to a chargeable transaction or give rise to
allowable relief within the meaning of the relevant statutory
provisions.
See Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 482.
'0 See Graham Mansfield, The 'New Approach' to Tax Avoidance: First
Circular,Then Linear,Now Narrower, 1989 BRIT. TAX REV. 5
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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justify a different result.'
This Article will review the current tax avoidance doctrines
as they apply to multi-step transactions and demonstrate, in
general, that the doctrines work well. This Article also
proposes that the courts are justified in using a case-by-case
approach to multi-step transactions for lack of an alternative
normative approach. Of course, it is likely that some of the
cases, in any given jurisdiction, were erroneously decided.
This is an inevitable result of the case-by-case method, which
is not usually due to normative error, but instead can be
attributed to a failure on the part of the courts to discern the
relevant legislative intent and to apply it to the facts of the
case.
Sections 2 and 3 of this Article focus on the taxpayer's
motive, legislative intent and the resultant* tax avoidance
dilemma. Section 4 analyzes the various tax avoidance

" See John Trley, Judicial Anti-Avoidance Doctrines: The U.S.
Alternatives, 1987 BRIT. TAX REV. 180; John Tley, JudicialAnti-Avoidance
Doctrines: The U.S. Alternative-Part II, 1987 BRIT. TAX REV. 220
[hereinafter, Tiley, U.S. Alternative]; John Tley, JudicialAnti-Avoidance
Doctrines: Corporations and Conclusions, 1988 BRIT. TAX REV. 108
[hereinafter Tiley, Corporationsand Conclusions]. Tiley's articles present
an excellent analysis of the relevant doctrines, but all come to the final
conclusion that:
As the United Kingdom courts wonder how to develop the new
approach, it is hoped that they will be extremely wary of an
enthusiastic adoption of United States doctrines. In that system a
number of doctrines often overlapping and frequently insufficiently
delineated, have been developed... . Once however one goes
beyond such doctrines, the United States experience, at least as it
has struck this writer, is that the court has no chance of
demonstrating a firm intellectual foundation for what it is doing.
Id. at 142.
Tiley noted that U.S. doctrines tend to ignore several issues: 1) that the
need of certainty is part of the real world; 2) that tax is part of this real
world, and 3) that "there is a crucial difference of fact between the real
world in the United States and the real world of the United Kingdom." Id.
at 143. For example, in Ramsay and White the U.K. courts did not follow
the general doctrines developed in the United States, but neither did the
courts follow what many erroneously understood to be their own tax
avoidance concepts.
Contrary to Tiley's viewpoint, the U.S. doctrines are not rigid, nor do
they present bright line rules. The doctrines can simply be applied to fit a
given case and applicable statutory provision. This is the preferred way of
statutory construction as it has been applied by many U.S., U.K., and Israeli
courts. However, one can fully agree with Tiley's point of the need to tie the
Published
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doctrines of the three legal systems. Sections 5 and 6 analyze
the tax avoidance doctrines as applied to the more difficult
linear transaction cases.

2. TAXPAYER'S MOTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Many courts stress that the tax avoidance motive of a
taxpayer is immaterial."
A taxpayer has a right to
legitimately minimize taxes.1 3 Thus, there is nothing to be
gained in revealing the taxpayer's motive in the given
transaction.
What is relevant, however, is a court's
interpretation of the statutory intent as applied to the
particular transaction under review. By holding the taxpayer's
motive immaterial and the statutory intent relevant to a given
transaction, the examination of the transaction becomes
objective rather than subjective.
The use of the term "taxpayer's purpose" may be more
suitable in this context. For example, the "taxpayer's purpose"
in a multi-step scheme is to achieve her final goal. Motive
reflects the reason why she structured the transaction in such
form. Motive is to be ignored, while the "purpose" is usually
relevant. This is particularly true when, taken together, the
motive and the purpose have the effect of achieving the desired
result. 4 As Justice Vitkon of the Israeli Supreme Court
stated:
Nothing is to be gained by an investigation and search
for the real motives [of the taxpayers]. It is an illusion
to presume that the citizen is not aware of the fiscal
consequences of his doings and misdoings, and to
require him to be naive.'"
The U.S. Supreme Court responded to the Internal
Revenue Service's ("I.R.S.'s") emphasis on taxpayer motive

1"See, e.g., Judge Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809,

810 (1934) (quoted at supra note 5).
13 See discussion supra note 5.

14 See Peter Millet, Artificial Tax Avoidance-The English andAmerican
Approach, [1986] BRIT. TAX REV. 327, 330; see generally Randolph Paul,
Motive and Intent in Federal Tax Law, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL
TAXATION 255, 271-304 (Callaghan ed. 1938).

"GDirector of Land Appreciation Tax v. Tamir, C.A. 262/65, 20(1) P.D.
695,
699-700.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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instead of intent by stating: 'We must confess to some skepticism as to whether such a verbal mutation would be of any
practical consequence. " " Where the form chosen by the
taxpayer is accepted, there is no need to inquire into his
motive and a decision of form versus substance in a given case
is dependent upon the statutory intent or policy of the law in
question. 7 As one commentator noted:
We may therefore wish to deny tax advantages where
use of particular forms serve no adequate non-tax goals.
While purpose is central in distinguishing between
acceptable and unacceptable uses of forms, purpose
here generally can be equated with function. Thus, it
is possible largely to ignore state of mind considerations
and to rely almost entirely on external factors. 8
As Justice Holmes stated in 1930: "The fact that [the
taxpayer] desired to evade the law, as it is called, is
immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law is
that you may intentionally go as close to it as you can if you do
not pass it." 9
Judge Learned Hand made a similar
observation a few years later in the much-quoted language of
Helvering v. Gregory.2" Even a specific anti-avoidance tax

16

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 286 (1960).

"Blum, supra note 8, at 535. Blum is of the opinion that even the
purpose of the taxpayer is not significant. Id- at 536. Lord Oliver in White
stated:
It seems to me, therefore, that the first and critical point is to be
[sic] borne in mind in considering the true ratio[nale] of Dawson is
that it rests not on some fancied principle that anything done with

a mind to minimizing tax is to be struck down, but on the premise
that the intermediate transfer, whose statutory consequences would
otherwise have resulted in payment of tax being postponed, did not

on the true construction of the Finance Act [of] 1965, constitute a
disposal attracting the consequences ... [of] that Act ... Lord
Wilberforce [in Ramsay) was at pains to stress that the fact the

motive of the transaction may be to avoid tax does not invalidate it

unless a particular enactment so provides ([1981] 1 All E.R. 865 at

871).
Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423, 451-52.
18

Blum, supra note 8, at 543-44.

1, Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) ("evade"
as used here means "avoid"); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2, 1 4.3.2
n.16; see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20 69 F.2d at 810 (quoted supranote 5).
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provision with a reference to a taxpayer's motive or intent is
in practice very difficult to implement, since it may include
words such as "principal purpose of evasion or avoidance of
federal income tax."2 1
The same difficulty has been faced by the Israeli Supreme
Court where the statute includes a general anti-avoidance
provision," which was later amended by adding the phrase
"if one of the principal purposes of a certain transaction is tax
avoidance or the improper reduction of taxes," the tax assessor
may ignore the transaction and tax accordingly. This phrase
has not been interpreted as granting any meaningful authority
to the Israeli Treasury." However, it may have a general interrorem effect on taxpayers and their tax advisers in causing
them to become more scrupulous and more reluctant to adopt
absurd artificial tax avoidance schemes. Thus, this language
may contribute to the prevention of schemes which would fail
to hold any water when tested by any knowledgeable tax agent
or by any court which applies general legal standards.
However, from time to time a court will refer to the
taxpayer's motive, and motive will play a role in the court's
decisions. For example, the United States Supreme Court in
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States,2 4 referred to the taxpayer's
intent or motive in its discussion of Lyon's agreements, but at
the same time stressed the factor of the non-tax "economic
substance" of the agreements, or the requirement of a "change
in the economic interests of the relevant parties."2 5 In many
cases it is clear that the court's general impression of the
taxpayer's motive of tax avoidance influenced the final
outcome of the decision.2 6 When "deciding a fact issue[,] the
courts will analyze and scrutinize with a special zeal where

21 I.R.C. §§ 269, 382 (1986); see MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C. CHOMMIE,

FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 571 (3d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1991).

See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
Herzikovich v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 823/75, 30(3) P.D. 163, 167 (per
J. Cohen, H.) also adopted in Adeler v. Assessing Officer, T.A. (J-M) 36/78,
10 P.D.A. 363, 369.
24 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
2
61d. at 571-72, 582-83; Newman v. Commissioner, 894 F.2d 560, 563 (2d
Cir. 1990). One of the so-called "tests" for the step transaction doctrine
depends upon the "intended" plan of the parties. See infra notes 85-86 and
accompanying text.
26 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supranote 2, 1 4.3.2. n.23 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
22
23

1994]

TAXING LINEAR TRANSACTIONS

tax avoidance appears as a motive."27

3. THE DILEMMA OF THE TAX SYSTEMS
Modern tax statutes contain many formal routes and
different avenues that allow taxpayers to achieve varied
economic objectives or to readjust their businesses. Many of
these routes are elective or optional statutory tax incentives
operational at the taxpayer's will, provided that he is
consistent with the form and procedures elected. This is a
basic rule of tax planning. However, taxpayers must comply
not only with the letter of the statutes, but also with the
legislative intent as properly interpreted by the courts. Thus,
the selection of the proper form and the adherence to the
formalities and procedures of the law, while of vital
importance, are only the beginning of sound tax planning and
not the end. Since the form, formalities and procedures must
conform to the legislative intent, the freedom of the taxpayer
is somewhat illusory.
Legislative intent is difficult to ascertain and can only be
described in general terms. Although many times referred to
as legal doctrines, characterizations of legislative intent are at
best general norms, and at worst elusive generalizations with
very little practical value. This is an inevitable consequence
of statutory construction, and the general doctrines of tax
avoidance have adjusted well to most cases which provide the
court with "a firm intellectual foundation for what it is
doing."2 8 The main task for the court is to properly define
the legislative intent of the relevant statutory provision and to
apply it to the facts of the case.
Generally, however, when courts reject the taxpayer's
choice of form, they often emphasize that the incidence of
taxation reflects the substance of the transaction and that
mere form is not controlling to the extent that the two do not
coincide.2 9
Naturally, the dilemma of the taxpayer's choice of form and

27Paul, supra note 14, at 152.

See Tiley, Corporations and Conclusions, supra note 11, at 142
(expressing this criticism); cf. Chirelstein, supranote 6, at 472-74, and Paul,
supra note 14, at 265.
29 See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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the respective Treasury's authority to limit such choice should
be resolved by a suitable accommodation between the
conflicting needs of the two. 0
4. DOCTRINES OF TAx AVOIDANCE
4.1. Basic Concepts in the Three Systems
U.K. law has developed one major doctrine for tax
avoidance. Although the U.K. doctrine acknowledges the
taxpayer's basic right to choice of form, it prescribes that the
taxpayer is to be taxed on the basis of what he in fact did, and
not on the basis of what he might have done in order to reach
the same objective. 3
The leading U.K. case dealing with this matter, Inland
Revenue Comm'rs. v. Duke of Westminster, 2 is still valid
law,33 although qualified and distinguished under the socalled "new approach" of the House of Lords as pronounced in
W. T Ramsay, Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs."4 Lord
Wilberforce commented on the "new approach:"
To force the courts to adopt, in relation to closely
integrated situations, a step by step, dissecting,
approach which the parties themselves may have
negated, would be a denial rather than an affirmation
of the true judicial process. In each case the facts must
be established, and a legal analysis made: legislation
cannot be required or even be desirable to enable the
court to arrive at a conclusion which corresponds with
the parties' own intentions ... [t]o say that a loss (or
gain) which appears to arise at one stage in an
indivisible process, and which is intended to be and is
canceled out by a later stage, so that at the end of what
was bought as, and planned as, a single continuous
operation, is not such a loss (or gain) as the legislation

30

See Chirelstein, supra note 6, at 441.

8' See Millett, supra note 14, at 329.
32 [1935] All E.R. 259.
" See Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423 (Lord Oliver referring to
Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser in Ramsay, supra note 6).
34 [1981] 2 W.L.R. 449.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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is dealing with, is in my opinion well, and indeed
essentially, within the judicial function. 5
In White, Lord Oliver explained that in Ramsay the court
decided to ignore the steps taken by the taxpayer with no
business purpose whatsoever
other than the artificial manufacture of what was
intended to be an allowable loss in such a way that the
taxpayer suffered no loss at all in fact because, by
another integrated and pre-planned transaction, the
artificially contrived loss was balanced precisely by a
non-chargeable gain .... But the fact was, as was plain
to see, that those transactions not only were not
intended to be interrupted or to stand in isolation but
could not in fact have done so in the real world. They
were totally dependent upon and integrated with other
transactions whose purpose, and whose only purpose,
was to nullify their effects and to leave the taxpayer in
exactly the same position as they were before.36
Likewise, Lord Oliver did not find a new doctrine in
Ramsay, but rather stated:
What the case does demonstrate, as it seems to me, is
that the underlying problem is simply one of the
construction of the relevant statute and an analysis of
the transaction or transactions which are claimed to
give rise to the liability or the tax exemption. But it
does not follow that because the court, when confronted
with a number of factually separate but sequential
steps, is not compelled, in the face of the facts, to treat
them as if each of them had been effected in isolation,
that all sequential steps must invariably be treated as
integrated, interdependent and without individual legal
effect."7
Thus, the court, some five decades later, reached the same
conclusions as the U.S. Court in Gregory, although the
terminology used in the two cases differed. The Ramsay court
35 Id. at 459.
3g [1988] 3 W.L.R at 453-54 (per Lord Oliver).
37
1d. at 454.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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used the same businesspurpose doctrine originated in Gregory,
but simply did not refer to it as a "doctrine." "
In Gregory, the taxpayer, in her personal capacity, wanted
to sell securities held by her corporation. In order to avoid
having the generated income taxed as dividends, she caused
the corporation to transfer the securities to another newly
established corporation and attempted to receive the securities
as a part of a nontaxable liquidation of the new corporation,
pursuant to the predecessor of section 368(a)(1) of the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."). The Court refused to allow
the taxpayer's strategy, but decided
what actually occurred [was] ... [slimply an operation
having no business or corporate purpose--a mere device
which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as
a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole
object and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business
or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of
corporate shares to the petitioner.3 9
Judge Learned Hand further explained the doctrine as
follows:
The doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering ... means that in
construing words of a tax statute which describe
commercial or industrial transactions we are to
understand them to refer to transactions entered upon
for commercial or industrial purposes and not to include
transactions entered upon for no other motive but to
escape taxation.4 °

38 See supra note 5; see generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2,
4.3.4.
3" Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
41 Commissioner v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570,
572 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 955 (1950). See Knetsch v. United
States where an elaborate taiC savings scheme, which would yield
substantial tax savings at a very small out-of-pocket cost for large interest
payments, was ignored for tax purposes. The court stated that the
taxpayer's transaction could only yield him a tax deduction. See Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960). In a later decision, which presented
another facet of the same transaction, the taxpayer was denied a loss
deduction for a later year when the unsuccessful scheme was abandoned.
The loss was not a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit as

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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The same approach has been adopted by the Israeli court,
although a general anti-avoidance provision appears in almost
all Israeli tax statutes. For example, section 86 of the Tax
Ordinance41 reads:
If the tax assessor is of the opinion that a certain
transaction which reduces, or might reduce, the tax
payable, is artificial or fictitious, or that a certain
disposal is not effective, or if one of the principal
purposes of a certain transaction is tax avoidance or the
improper reduction of taxes, he is entitled to ignore the
transaction or the disposal, and to tax accordingly.
Avoidance of taxation, and the reduction of taxes could
be viewed as improper even if they do not violate the
law.42
The main theory which has been advanced by the Israeli
Supreme Court for interpreting the artificiality standard of
section 86, and its counterparts in other Israeli tax statutes,
is the business standard, which requires that the transaction
have business purposes other than tax avoidance.43 The
"other business purposes" must be of some significance and not
merely act as a cover for tax avoidance purposes.44 It is not
enough that the transaction could theoretically have a
business justification if it did not have one in fact.45
Section 86 of the Tax Ordinance also offers an alternative
test to determine whether the transaction is "fictitious." A
"fictitious" transaction is one that is "without reality or
substance in the legal sense, which only appeared to be carried
out in order to disguise the real transaction between or among
the parties. A fictitious transaction is ... without any real

the statute required. See Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932 (1965).
4' The Tax Ordinance (New Version), supra note 1.
42 The quoted material was translated by Yitzhak Hadari. For a general
discussion of Israeli tax avoidance law see Hadari, supra note 1.
' Mefi, Ltd. v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 265/67, 21(2) P.D. 593; Assessing
Officer v. Ulpaney Hasrata Israel, Ltd., C.A. 11/74, 29(1) P.D. 297 (both per
J. Vitkon) [hereinafter Mefi-Ulpaney Hasrata cases].
44T.M.B. Ltd. v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 83/81, 40(3) P.D. 402, 410 (per
J. Bach).
"' Grinberg Ltd. v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 495/88, 46(2) P.D. 243 (per
Chief
Justice
Shamgar).
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economic substance or legal substance."4' 6 This quotation
sounds as if it could have been taken from U.S. or U.K.
The "artificial" transaction test also
jurisprudence.4 7
mentioned in section 86 has been applied by the Israeli courts
using U.K. or U.S. terminology.4"
The Israeli term "artificial" is sometimes interpreted as
meaning a transaction which does not correspond with
acceptable business standards, even though it is legally
valid.4 9
For example, in one Israeli case, the taxpayer turned his
large single home into a condominium, with each room, or
rooms with adjacent utilities, being registered as separate
apartments, even though he continued to use the entire house
as a single home. His only purpose in so doing was to
minimize his property tax. The court acknowledged that the
form selected by the taxpayer conformed to the substance of
the transaction. Indeed, the house was registered and became
a condominium in the full legal sense. Nevertheless, the
entire exercise was useless for tax avoidance purposes because
it did not conform to acceptable business standards and lacked
any business purpose.5 0
The court reviewed the case despite the fact that at the
time the pertinent property tax statute did not have a general
tax avoidance provision. The court decided the case on the
basis of general tax avoidance theories, which were formerly
adopted for income tax purposes and have long been a part of
the Tax Ordinance statute.
Again, we observe that despite differences in terminology
and statutory framework the U.S., U.K., and Israeli tax laws

46 Assessing Officer v. Ismar, Ltd., C.A. 102/59, 14(3) P.D. 2165, 2168
(author's translation).
41 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935); see Knetsch v.
United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); BITTKER & LoKKEN, supra note 2,
4.3.3.; supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (quotations from Ramsay
and White opinions).
4 See Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) ("[a]
given result at the end of a straight path is not made a 'different result
because reached by following a dubious path'," and referring to the
unnecessary step as "transparently artificial"). For the United Kingdom, see
Mansfield, supra note 10, at 15.
" Assessing Officer v. Ismar, Ltd., C.A. 102/59, 14(3) P.D. 2165, at 2168.
'o See Spear v. Director of Property Tax, C.A. 734/74, 30(1) P.D. 271.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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have been following similar anti-avoidance concepts. This
demonstrates that the precise tax doctrine or terminology used
by the U.S., U.K. or Israeli courts is of little significance5 '
because the basic theories are similar. Although a lot has
been written pushing for a precise demarcation in the lines
between the various doctrines,52 a clear tax avoidance scheme
has, in any event, been inoperative for tax purposes in all
three systems. We have already observed that the three
systems have common norms in this area, and the precise
definition of each tax avoidance rule, or doctrine, does not
always serve useful purposes.53 All the systems share the
same dilemma when confronted with a multi-step scheme with
an acceptable business purpose for the entire scheme, and
sometimes with a business purpose for each separate step.
This dilemma will be further elaborated upon below, but
another Israeli example is instructive.
Under the Israeli Capital Gains Tax on Real Estate,54
there is a special exemption for the sale of a residential home
inherited by the taxpayer, provided that his share in the home
is less than 50%.55 In one such case a taxpayer and her
sister each inherited precisely 50% of a certain home. With a
view to a possible future sale of her portion of the house,
although none was concrete at that point, each taxpayer made
a taxable sale of 0.5% of her portion. Later, the taxpayer's
portion (i.e., 49.5%) was in fact sold, and she argued for the
tax exemption. Justice Barak responded:
The court of the first instance was correct in holding
that the transaction had contradicted acceptable
standards of economic life and it had lacked any
business purpose, and its only purpose had been to get
around the obstacle of the... [pertinent] section of the
law, in requiring that [an exempted] sale be less than
5' See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2, 1 4.3.5 nn.92-95.
52 See Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance And Income Measurement,

87 MIcH. L. REV. 365, 388-438 (1988); Tley, U.S. Alternative, supranote 11,
at 220-44; Robert W. Wood, Is the Step TransactionDoctrineStill a Threat
for Taxpayer?, 72 J. TAX'N 296 (1990).
53 See supra note
11.
5"See Land Appreciation Tax Act of 1963, in YITZHAK HADARI, CAPITAL

GAINs TAX OF REAL ESTATE, Vol. 1 (1993) (in Hebrew).
Land
Tax
Act of 2014
1963, § 49(b)(4).
Published by" Penn
Law:Appreciation
Legal Scholarship
Repository,

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:1

50% of the house. We are not concerned here with
legitimate tax planning but with an artificial
transaction, that should be ignored.56
It should be noted that the first step of the transaction was
legally effective, the 0.5% of the house was sold and the title
was transferred. However, since this step lacked any business
purpose, except for the enjoyment of the tax exemption, the
taxpayer's illegitimate choice of form was to be ignored for tax
purposes without regard to the taxpayer's obvious motive. A
U.S. tax court would have reached the same result whether it
was based on the business purpose concept or the steptransaction theory.57
Despite difficulties with the
interpretation of Duke of Westminster,"8 U.K. courts would
have ruled the same way, because of the new approach
illustrated in Ramsay."
4.2. Application to Clear Tax Avoidance Cases Via Linear
Transactions
U.S. courts have prevented unjustified and unwarranted
tax avoidance schemes under various tax ,doctrines. The
principal doctrines employed are: 1) general "tax avoidance,"
2) the preference to be given to the "substance" of the
transaction rather than the "form" selected by the taxpayer,
and 3) the "business purpose" doctrine-the "step transaction"
variation (under which pre-agreed or pre-arranged integrated
steps of the same plan or scheme are to be considered as one
economic transaction for tax purposes, as opposed to giving tax
effect to each separate step).6 " We can easily add to those
doctrines the basic theory that those who earn income ought
to be taxed for it, or the theory of assignment of income, under
which the case is decided without specific reference to any of
the above tax avoidance doctrines.6 All these theories "are so

"' Kahn v. Director of Land Appreciation Tax, C.A. 389/82, 39(1) P.D.
794, 796.
" See Associated Wholesale Groceries, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d
1517 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Section 5 of text.
58 Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Duke of Westminster, [1935] All E.R. 259.
5 See Millet, supra note 14.
60 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2, 1 4.3.1.
"' See Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) ([U]sually
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pervasive that they resemble a preamble to the Code,
describing the framework within which all statutory provisions
are to function. But these judicial presuppositions, like the
canons of statutory construction, are more successful in
establishing attitudes and modes than in supplying crisp answers to specific questions." 2
Consider again the Gregory 3 case where the Court
emphasized 4 that the substance of the activity in question
had no "business or corporate purpose."65 The Court decided
that only in6 "form" was there a reorganization but not in
"substance." Thus, the step transaction doctrine may be said
to have originated with Gregory. The doctrine rendered the
purported liquidation a
mere device which put on the form of a corporate
reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real

character, and the sole object and accomplishment of
which was the consummation of a preconceived plan,
not one to reorganize a business or any part of a
business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate [assets]
to the petitioner.6 7
The Court declined to "exalt artifice above reality" and thus
ruled that there had been no reorganization within its
statutory meaning.6 8
it is the synthesis of basic income-earner theory with substance over form
theory.); Robino, Inc. Pension Trust v. Commissioner, 894 F.2d 342 (9th Cir.
1990), affg T.C.M. 1987-468 (sale was in substance a sale by individuals and
not by the intermediate pension trusts, who earlier bought the property
from the individuals and immediately resold it to the ultimate buyer).
Robino was decided without invoking a specific tax avoidance doctrine such
as the step-transaction doctrine. The same approach was taken by the
Israeli Supreme Court, in Assessing Officer v. Shalit, C/A 450/73, 28(2) P.D.
287 (Justice Vitkon ignored the intermediate step of transfer of property to
related party and finding only one transaction between the taxpayer and the
third party.).
62 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2,
4.3.1; see also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
e See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
4
d. at 469; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
65 See supra note 5 and Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir.

1934).

See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
71d.
8
Id. (quoted recently by one U.S. Court of Appeals in Associated
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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Although the opinion in Gregory combines the tax
avoidance doctrines, its emphasis on the business purpose rule
is very similar to the interpretation of an "artificial" or even
"fictitious" transaction in section 86 of Israel's Tax Ordinance.
This interpretation would cover transactions made for no other
business purpose "except for tax avoidance,"
or any
transaction which "disguises trie real business between the
parties." 0 We find similar reasoning expressed by the House
of Lords: "[T]here must be steps inserted which have no
commercial (business) purpose apart from the avoidance of a
liability to tax .... The inserted step had no business purpose
apart from the deferment of tax, although it had a business
effect." 7
In fact, the Gregory court correctly stressed the role of
legislative intent in statutory construction." The legislature
intended to allow corporate reorganization to adjust a
taxpayer's form, but there was no legislative intent or policy
to enable the tax-free channeling or distribution of corporate
assets.73 The Gregory court thus defined the statute's
purpose and properly applied it to the facts, with the
inevitable outcome that the income was treated as taxable
dividends.
In multi-step corporate transactions, the step-transaction
doctrine is often applied by U.S. courts as a variation of the
"substance and form" concept or even the business purpose
concept. As noted by the court in Associated Wholesale
Groceries,Inc. v. United States, generally,
[t]he step transaction principle derives from the classic
tax case Gregory v. Helvering . . . , and its progeny. In
Gregory, the Supreme Court's analysis of the tax effect
of a transaction involved .. . [p]utting aside ... the

Wholesale Groceries, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.
1991)).
"' The Mefi-Ulpaney Hasrata cases, supra note 43; see supra text
accompanying notes 41-49.
7'Assessing Officer v. Ismar, Ltd., C.A. 102/59, 14(3) P.D. 2165.
"' Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226 (Lord Brightman's opinion);
see Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423, 430 (Lord Keith taking a similar
approach).
72 See supra note 5.
" E.g., Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811'(1934).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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question of motive in respect of taxation altogether, and
fixing the character of the proceeding by what actually
occurred. The analysis revealed a transactional step
which the Court characterized as 'an operation having
no business or corporate purpose."' 4
Though not called the "step transaction doctrine," the same
approach is used by the House of Lords. For example, Lord
Oliver stated: "[T]he absence of any commercial motive [i.e.,
purpose] underlies the artificiality of the interrelated
transactions and entitles the court to disregard them because
they are not intended75 to produce anything other than an
artificial fiscal result."
In both the U.S. and U.K. systems, it is immaterial that
the intermediate, interrelated step has permanent legal,
practical and fiscal consequences attached to it." The Israeli
Court, in Kahn," adopted the same approach, but without
reference to the "step transactions" or "interrelated steps"
terminology.
Although the intermediate step was fully
effective in all other legal respects, it was without tax effect
because it lacked any business purpose other than tax
avoidance. The court's approach was consistent with the
legislative intent of the exemption in question."
The U.S. step-transaction doctrine and its corresponding
U.K. and Israeli doctrines in the context of linear, interrelated
steps of an integrated transaction are discussed below. The
principal legal point here is that such transactions should be
analyzed as a whole rather than analyzing each step
separately. When an intermediate step is utilized by the
taxpayer, it achieves the same tax result as when the steptransaction doctrine is linked to the general concept of
assignment of income:"9

" Associated Wholesale Groceries, Inc. v. U.S., 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th
Cir. 1991).
The court in Gregory, therefore, held there was no
reorganization within its statutory meaning. See supra text accompanying
note 68.
"sCraven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 455-56; see also supra note 6.
76 Id at 456.
7 Kahn v. Director of Land Appreciation Tax, C.A. 389/82, 39(1)
P.D.
794.
78 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79

Id.
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The tax consequences which arise from gains from a
sale of property are not finally to be determined solely
by means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the
transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step,
from the commencement of negotiations to the
consummation of the sale, is relevant.8 0
Similar reasoning in a linear multi-step, integrated
transaction was advanced by the House of Lords in Furniss v.
Dawson"' and White,82 although each case ultimately
arrived at a different conclusion. Although the precise issue
has not been reviewed, it is expected that a similar conclusion
would be reached by the Israeli courts.
Finally, in all three tax systems, we have to be wary of
generalizations. Although it is important to understand the
above tax avoidance doctrines and attempt to apply them in
analyzing specific cases and issues, their shortcomings are
quite obvious. The doctrines are only the starting point of the
analysis, and as Judge Learned Hand observed, their
generality is their major limitation."
They have very little
practical use in resolving complex issues of fact and law. The
exact findings of fact, as well as the analysis of the relevant
statutory intent (i.e., policy) and its application to the
particular facts are all vital.
It is from this perspective that the step transaction
doctrine can play its role as a tool for analyzing the difficult
fact patterns of linear transactions. Given certain findings of
fact, the court can determine if the relevant statutory intent
is met. 4
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945). Court
Holding was based on a finding of facts by the lower court that the
transaction was done by the corporation and not by shareholders. See also
supra note 61; cf.United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451
(1950).
80

81 [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226.

[1988] 3 W.L.R. 423.
Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F.2d 931, 933 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 287
U.S. 667 (1932). See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473,476 (1939); Waterman
S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 430 F.2d 1185, 1192 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
84 Lord Keith stated in White:
My Lords, in my opinion the nature of the principle to be derived
from the three cases is this: the court must first construe the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
82
83
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5. THE APPLICATION OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE
TO LINEAR CASES
As noted, the step transaction doctrine is often used by
U.S. courts in analyzing multi-step linear transactions. The
doctrine is a derivative of the broader tax concept that
substance should prevail over form. Courts have developed
tests determining when the doctrine should be applied, but
have failed to define clearly the scope of the tests. One can
view the tests as additional guidelines to be applied if they fit
the given transactions. There are three main tests for
invoking the doctrine, though it is unclear if all three tests, or
only one test, must be met before the courts will utilize the
doctrine.
One test, the "end result" test, is satisfied where the court
finds separate steps or transactions constituting "component
parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be
taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result." 5
Courts have explained that this test, like the broader
substance over form doctrine, fits situations where a single
plan was intended from the outset to achieve a specific result
but was to be performed by a series of transactions. In such
a case all of the steps are to be viewed as a single
transaction.8 6 What is meant by "intended" in this context is
the "objective purpose.""
A second test, the "interdependent test," requires an
analysis of "whether on a reasonable interpretation of objective

relevant enactment in order to ascertain its meaning; it must then
analyze the series of transactions in question, regarded as a whole,
so as to ascertain its true effect in law; and finally it must apply the
enactment as construed to the true effect of the series of
transactions and so decide whether or not the enactment was
intended to cover it. The most important feature of the principle is
that the series of transactions is to be regarded as a whole.
Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 430.
85 King's Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (1969).
88 See Kanawha Gas & Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691
(5th Cir. 1954); Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. United States,
443 F.2d 147, 151 (10th Cir. 1971); Associated Wholesale Groceries, Inc. v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1991).
87 See discussion supra Section 2 "Taxpayer's Motive and Legislative
Intent," in general, and supra notes 14, 25 and accompanying text, in
particular.
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facts the steps were so interdependent that the legal relations
created by one transaction would have been fruitless without
a completion of the series."88 The "interdependent test"
focuses on the interrelation among the different steps, rather
than on the "end result" of the series of steps, particularly
when each step does not make business sense and would be
fruitless without the completion of the rest of the integrated
steps.8 9
The third test, the "binding commitment" test, originated
in Commissioner v. Gordon,90 and is usually not regarded as
a precondition for the application of the doctrine." This test
is the most restrictive, and it makes clear that a contractual
obligation to carry out the entire series of steps is the best
evidence justifying the application of the step transaction
doctrine. 2 Even cases requiring the binding commitment
test agree that a sufficient showing of a general understanding
or pre-arrangement of a business or financial commitment, or
a showing of an intent to perform all the steps within
relatively short time, will suffice to invoke the step transaction
doctrine. 3
The Israeli Supreme Court did not apply the step
transaction doctrine where a formal pre-agreement was
missing, despite the existence of a "general understanding and
oral consent."94 It is doubtful whether this precedent will be
88 Randolph Paul & Philip Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED
STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 200, 254 (2d Series, 1938). This approach

was adopted in cases such as King Entrs., 418 F.2d 511, and Associated
Groceries, 927 F.2d 1517; see also Seymour S. Mintz & William T. Plumb,
Jr., Step Transactions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAX'N 247 (1954).
8 See McDonald's Restaurants of Ill.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d
520, 524 (7th Cir. 1982); Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir.
1980); Kauper v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir. 1976); Paul &
Zimet, supra note 88.
90 391 U.S. 83, 88 (1968).
" King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (1969); BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 2, 4.3.5.
82 See, e.g., Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226.
See Kings Enters., 418 F.2d at 511; McDonald's Restaurants v.
Commissioner, 688 F.2d at 525; see also infra notes 145-47 and
accompanying text.
14 See T.M.B. v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 83/81, 40(3) P.D. 402. One ought
to compare this approach with that of the U.K. court in Dawson: "The day
is not saved for the taxpayer because the arrangement is unsigned or
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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followed by future Israeli courts.
Courts in the United Kingdom do not employ any of the
above mentioned U.S. tests. In cases where pre-planned tax
avoidance schemes are evident, Lord Brightman in Dawson, 5
stated:
My Lords, in my opinion the rationale of the new
approach is this. In a pre-planned tax savings scheme,
no distinction is to be drawn for fiscal purposes,
because none exist in reality, between (i) a series of
steps which are followed through by virtue of an
arrangement which falls short of a binding contract,
and (ii) a like series of steps which are followed through
because the participants are contractually bound to
take each step in seriatim.9 6
In addition, Lord Brightman noted that "Ramsay [held]
that a fiscal result is to be no different if the several steps are
preordained rather than precontracted." 7
It should be
emphasized that this approach was quoted with full approval
by the court in White. 8
A scheme of multiple intermediate steps, which forms part
of a pre-conceived or "preordained" plan,9" is not problematic
for U.K. courts, when each step of the transaction is
meaningless without the fulfillment of all the other interim
steps. This is particularly so when all the steps are carried
out concurrently l'o or when later steps cancel former steps
so that the first and the final steps reflect the real economic
transaction. Thus, the U.K. courts did not have severe
difficulty in rejecting such circular, self-concealing or selfdefeating plans. 0 1 The court could have rejected the plans
contains the magic words 'this is not a binding contract'." Furniss v.
Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226, 242 (per Lord Brightman).
95 [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226.
ged at 242.

Id at 242 (referring to Ramsay) (emphasis added).
98

[1988] 3 W.L.R. 423.

s See Furniss v. Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226.
100 ao
101 See W.T. Ramsay, Ltd., v. Inland Revenue Commr's, [1981] 2 W.L.R.
449; Inland Revenue Commr's v. Burmah Oil, Ltd., [1982] S.T.C. 30 (where
the Ramsay approach was carried one step further, but "the salient features
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pursuant to the U.S. tax avoidance theories, including the
business purpose, substance over form, and step transaction.
Under similar circumstances, U.S. courts will generally reach
the same results as the U.K. courts utilizing these
doctrines.'
For more problematic cases the U.S. approach for applying
the step-transaction doctrine could be helpful, provided the
tests are treated as helpful guidelines rather than as rigid
rules, since the tests are "notably abstruse-even for such an
abstruse field as tax law."'0 3 When analyzing a multi-step
transaction, common sense and logic would dictate the use of
the tests, but not as mandatory rules of law. Other
considerations, such as the relative ease of administering the
tax system in question should be taken into account.
6. APPLICATION OF TAX AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES
TO DIFFICULT LINEAR CASES

6.1. U.K. Case Law
More difficult problems usually arise over the conflict of
substance and legitimate choice of form. Thus, the U.K. court
in Dawson... extended the Ramsayl0 5 -Burmah e6
approach to certain linear transactions where business and
legal effects could be attached to separate steps and to the
entire transaction. ° " Thus, it was unnecessary for the
courts to utilize rules similar to the U.S. step transaction
"tests .,108

(quoting Lord Oliver)).
102

See Rosenberg, supra note 52, at 426-27 n.177.

...Redding v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 1980). After
accepting this caveat, the court in McDonald's Restaurantscorrectly applied
the test. See McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 520,
524 (7th Cir. 1982).
104 See supra note 11.
10, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 220.
106 Inland Revenue Comm'rs v. Burmah Oil, [1982] S.T.C. 30.
107 This approach was initiated by Lord Diplock in Burmah, supra note
101, at 32 and continued in Dawson, supra note 11, where the generally
legitimate business purpose of the entire plan did not achieve its tax-saving
purpose. See Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423, 428 (Lord Keith's
opinion).
108 See supra Section 5 of text.
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In Dawson, the taxpayers' "purpose" was to achieve the
legitimate commercial goal of selling their shares of stock in
two U.K. family companies to a third party. In order to defer
capital gains, the taxpayers prearranged for an Isle of Man
company under their control, Greenjacket, to purchase the
shares. In exchange, the taxpayers would receive Greenjacket
stock. In turn, the taxpayers immediately sold the stock to the
third party buyer, Wood Bastow, while maintaining access to
the consideration paid.
The intermediate step with the Isle of Man company was
quickly arranged during the negotiations between the
taxpayers and the third-party buyer. The entire negotiation
process was "perhaps ... all over in time for lunch."'
The Dawson case presented an extreme situation which
justified attributing the income to the taxpayers on the basis
of the general attribution of income theory. This would be
similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner
v. Court Holding."'
The Dawson decision could also be justified on the basis of
the step transaction doctrine as espoused in U.K. law. For
example, Lord Brightman stated:
Ramsay says that the fiscal result is to be no different
if the several steps are pre-ordained rather than
precontracted. For example, in the instant case[,] tax
will, on the Ramsay principle, fail to be assessed on the
basis that there was a tripartite contract between the
Dawsons, Greenjacket, and Wood Bastow, under which
the Dawsons contracted to transfer their shares in the
operating companies to Greenjacket in return for an
allotment of shares in Greenjacket, and under which
Greenjacket simultaneously contracted to transfer the
same shares to Wood Bastow for a sum in cash....
Ramsay says that this fiscal result cannot be avoided
because the pre-ordained series of steps are to be found
in an informal arrangement instead of a binding
contract. The day is not saved for the taxpayer because
the arrangement is unsigned or contains the magic
oFurniss v. Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. 226, at 236 (per Lord Brightman).
324 U.S. 331 (1945); see also supranotes 61, 79, 80 and accompanying
Published
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words 'this is not a binding contract.""'
First, according to Lord Brightman, it is sufficient that a
preordained series of transactions, forming a single composite
transaction, exists. This composite transaction may achieve a
legitimate business purpose. The transaction in Dawson
achieved the sale of shares of the operating companies by the
Dawsons to Wood Bastow. It did not in Ramsay. Second, to
be disregarded for tax purposes, there must be steps inserted
which have no business purpose except for the avoidance of
taxes, even if they have "business effect." Finally, the court
must look at the end result. In Dawson, the inserted step was
the use of Greenjacket to buy stock from the Dawsons and to
sell it to Wood Bastow.
The formulation, therefore, involves two findings of
fact: first, whether there was a preordained series of
transactions, i.e. a single composite transaction; second,
whether that transaction contained steps which were
inserted without any commercial or business purpose
apart from a tax advantage. Those are facts to be found
by the commissioners. They may be primary facts or,
more probably, inferences to be drawn from the primary
facts."
Note, however, that the Dawson case did not establish any
rules. Rather, it. set forth the circumstances under which
several transactions should be treated as one. There is a close
resemblance between the U.S. step-transaction doctrine and
the U.K. concept of the treatment of multiple preordained
transactions as a whole. In both systems it is necessary to
interpret the relevant statute for its intent and to analyze the
given series of transactions in their entirety in order to
characterize the transactions in tax law."3 Both the U.S.
and U.K. tax systems apply the statutes to multiple-step
transactions in order to determine if they fall within the given
legislative intent.
Neither Ramsay nor Dawson sets forth any new concepts

..Dawson, [1984J 2 W.L.R., at 242 (per Lord Brightman with whose
opinion the rest of the Justices agreed).
112 Id
"1

See supra note 84 (quoting Lord Keith).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2

1994]

TAXING LINEAR TRANSACTIONS

of law which would negate an otherwise legitimate choice of
form allowed by statute. The U.K. statute allowed for the
transfer of shares to the Isle of Man company and for the Isle
of Man company to sell the shares to a third party. It is
important to emphasize that tax planning of this nature is not
fatal. What was fatal in Dawson was the taxpayer's complete
control over the end result because of the manner in which the
transaction was pre-planned and executed. The time factor
could not be ignored, given that the entire series of
transactions was completed "in time for lunch."" 4
It is true that time factors of this sort are not a part of any
sound tax norm and the short time between steps is mainly
proof of a single transaction." 5 However, we cannot expect
a sound system of tax law and efficient tax administration to
follow a series of transactions for several tax years in order to
determine retroactively if they comprise a single transaction.
Such a norm would badly damage a taxpayer's certainty and
predictability even while enhancing sound tax policy.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Dawson outcome is
reserved for extreme situations only. It is not a general norm
under which all pre-planned series of transactions will be
treated. Because Dawson did not propose a norm, the court in
White," 6 when faced with a different factual situation,
reached the opposite result, surprising many
commentators."'
In White, there were a series of linear transactions using
an Isle of Man company in a manner similar to Dawson. In
contrast to Dawson, however, before the transaction with the
ultimate buyer was complete, it was discovered that legal and
practical obstacles to the deal existed. The taxpayers then
made their choice of form and chose to use an Isle of Man
company for any future transactions. This choice was accepted

114
11

See Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R. at 242.
Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423, 573 (Lord Goff's dissenting

opinion).
1 See id.
117 See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 10; Karen B. Brown, Applying
CircularReasoning to Linear Transactions: Substance Over Form Theory
in U.S. and U.K. Tax Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 169 (1992)
(from the other side of the Atlantic). See John Tiley, Note on Case, [1989]
BRIT. TAX REV. 20 (Tiley's note accords with his earlier writings, supra note
Published
by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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by the parties although the intermediate company, fully
controlled by the taxpayer, made the transaction under terms
close to those originally negotiated by the parties, allowing the
taxpayer to enjoy the use of the proceeds. The time which
lapsed between the two transactions was relatively short, just
a few months. However, the parties did not complete the
transactions "in time for lunch."" 8
Criticism can be leveled at what seems to be the bottom
line and the majority opinion: "that practical certainty,
whatever it may mean, is now the test.""' To the contrary,
this is not the test. Rather, the test is whether the original
taxpayer completed the entire transaction or whether there
was another transaction completed by another person,
independent enough to be accepted by the courts.2
The court in White, although by a narrow three to two
majority, decided that the final transaction was not part of a
preordained series of transactions, but rather an independent
transaction. There was no disposal of income by the English
taxpayers to the third-party purchaser for capital gains tax
purposes. A similar conclusion was reached by the court
where no connection was found between the taxpayer's sale to
an intermediary company and the later sale by the
intermediary company to a third party.''

118 Referring again to Lord Brightman's statement in Dawson, [1984] 2

W.L.R. at 242.
119 Tiley, supra note 117, at 25.
12 See Lord Goff's dissent in White. Lord Goff stated:
In the end, the question whether or not the overall transaction
constitutes for present purpose a composite transaction is very
much one of common sense, which the commissioners, are well
equipped to decide. I do not for myself regard this as giving rise to
any unacceptable uncertainty in practice. I have no doubt that, in
practice, the animal is easily recognizable.
Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 472.
121 The cases were conjoined appeals with Craven v. White, [1988] 3
W.L.R. 423. One case, Baylis v. Gregory, involved negotiations between the
taxpayer and a third party which later broke off. Promptly thereafter an
Isle of Man company was formed and there was exchange of stock with the
taxpayer. Finally, after two years the interim company made the sale to a
totally different buyer. See id. In the other case, Inland Revenue Comm'rs
v. Bowater, the taxpayer transferred land to related companies during
negotiations with a prospective buyer of the land. However, a contract for
the sale of the land to the buyer never materialized. Negotiations were later
resumed with the same third party buyer which culminated in a sale of the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2

19941

TAXING LINEAR TRANSACTIONS

The dissenting justices apparently would have applied a
general theory of taxation under which any choice of the
proper form for carrying out a final sale is to be attributed to
the taxpayer. This would be so if all steps were undertaken
with a view to the avoidance or reduction of taxes on an
anticipated transaction, even when it is not the "taxpayer's
transaction" at all. However, such an approach would be
contrary to the legislative intent. 2'
The majority opinion restricted the Dawson approach by
stating that Dawson would be applicable "only if at the time
when the first [in a series of step transactions] is entered into,
the taxpayer is in a position for all practical purposes to
[ensure] that the second [step] also is entered into."'2 3 Thus,
court decisions are highly dependent upon findings of fact, and
any attempt to formulate bright line rules suffers from the
same shortcomings as the U.S. rules.'2 4
As Lord Oliver put it, Dawson requires that the taxpayer
have "a degree of certainty and control over the end result at
the time when the intermediate steps are taken."1 25 This
standard does not require absolute agreement and certainty,
between the taxpayer and third party buyer, of all the terms
of the final transaction, but agreement on principal terms and
the practical likelihood of the final transaction being
consummated is essential. 21 In addition, it would not be
sufficient that the final transaction which occurs is a
land by the interim companies to the third party buyer. See id.
122 See supra Sections 2 and 3 of the text. If Lord Templeman restricts
his view to cases where negotiations with the final buyer are underway
when the second step is taken, there is no conceptual or real world approach
to such a theory. A tax expert is usually not consulted until the
negotiations with the third party have begun. From a general tax policy
viewpoint, it makes no difference if the consultation is called shortly before
the commencement of the negotiations. In fact, Lord Templeman even
contradicted himself when he joined the majority of the court in the Bowater
case, unless he was really focusing only on subtle variations in the facts
(i.e., whether or not the initial negotiations "broke off" prior to their
resumption).
123 Craven v. White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 431 (per Lord Keith). The second
transaction does not have to be identical to the one prearranged, see infra
notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 11, Section 5 of text in general, and text at supra note
103 in particular.
125 White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 465.
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transaction of the kind that is then envisaged by the
taxpayer. 2 7 For example, if the final buyer and terms of the
sale are unknown at the time of the intermediate step, but the
taxpayer knows there will be a sale of the asset, under Dawson
it would be impossible to analyze the steps as a single
composite transaction. 2 ' As Lord Jauncey stated:
Lord Wilberforce [in Ramsay] referred to two types of
schemes[,] namely, one where there was an accepted
obligation [or complete control] to carry out all steps in
the scheme once it started and the other where there
was an expectation that it would be so carried through
and no likelihood in practice that it would not.'29
In other words, in a linear transaction where the taxpayer
does not have control over the third party, a mere
"contemplation or intention" by the taxpayer, at the time of
completion of the first step, that the final transaction will be
completed is not sufficient to view the series of transactions as
a single transaction.' 0 It is in cases such as Dawson, where
all further steps were practically certain at the time when the
first step of the prearranged scheme took place, and the final
transaction was completed within a very short time, that the
Ramsay rule, or the step-transaction doctrine, applies to linear
transactions.' 3 1 Otherwise, the Ramsay-Dawson approach

127 [d
128 Id.

Lord Oliver's distinction might be too subtle and is subject to the
same criticism leveled against Lord Templeman. See supra note 122.
129 Id.
at 479.

130 kl

...
Lord Jauncey would view a series of transactions as one composite
linear transaction depending upon various factors, including: (1) the stage
of negotiations reached when the first step ended; (2) the "nature" of such
negotiations or arrangements; (3) the likelihood at the time of the first step
that the rest of the plan will be completed; and (4) the extent to which all
steps proceeded without genuine interruptions. Id. at 480.
The U.K. and U.S. courts faced with the same dilemma regarding steptransactions formulated similar rules. In general, see Section 5 of text.
Lord Jauncey even used the concept "interdependent," but he did not try to
define tests. Instead, he correctly referred to them as "factors" or, as I
prefer, "guidelines."
See supra Section 5 of text and infra text
accompanying notes 138-40.
Lord Jauncey formulated the following conclusion:
A step in a linear transaction which has no business purpose apart
from the avoidance or deferment of tax liability will be treated as
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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is inapplicable."3 2
An interim conclusion is that, for linear transactions which
extend beyond a tax year and for relatively longer periods, the
degree of certainty with respect to all principal terms of the
ultimate transaction is much greater than with respect to very
short term multiple, pre-planned linear transactions. This
conclusion reflects U.S. case law as well. 133
Further attacks on the forms offered to taxpayers by
statutes should be left to the legislature, as Lord Jauncey
stated in the White case:
I conclude my analysis of the three [joined] cases by
emphasizing that the Ramsay principle is a principle of
construction, that it does not entitle the courts to
legislate at large against specific acts of tax avoidance
where Parliament has not done so and that at the end

forming part of a preordained series of transactions or of a
composite transaction if it was taken at a time when negotiations
or arrangements for the carrying through as a continuous process
of a subsequent transaction which actually takes place had reached
a stage when there was no real likelihood that such subsequent
transaction would not take place and if thereafter such negotiations
or arrangements were carried through to completion without
genuine interruption.
Id. at 480-81.
But Lord Jauncey added, with intellectual honesty, that "I am conscious
that this may well constitute too rigid an approach to the problems and I
therefore put it forward as a tentative guide." Id. at 481.
Consequently, the U.K. court did not apply the Ramsay principle in
Shepherd v. Lyntress, Ltd., [1989] S.T.C. 617 and News InternationalP.C.
v. Shepherd [1989] S.T.C. 617, where there was a business purpose to the
initial steps of the transaction, and where the subsidiaries that were formed
realized gains from a sale against which they could offset their losses. The
court found no gains went to the parent company which transferred the
assets to its subsidiaries. In addition, the court found when the first steps
were performed, the next steps had not been organized.
" Consider R. v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs., [1992] S.T.C. 581 where
taxpayer transferred certain stocks tax free to his spouse prior to a
prearranged sale to a third party. A leading tax counsel (who gave a second
opinion) believed that there was a risk that the transfer to the spouse would
be ignored under the Ramsay-Dawson principle, and the court confirmed
that there was such arisk (although no decision was rendered due to special
facts involved in the case).
13 For a discussion of the "binding commitment" test and its relevance
to short-term transactions per the McDonald's court, see McDonald's
Restaurants of fll. v. Commissioner 688 F.2d 520, at 525 and infra notes
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of the day the question will always be whether the
event or combination of events relied upon amount to a
chargeable transaction or give rise to allowable relief
within the meaning of the relevant statutory
provisions."3
In this respect one may observe that the White decision is
not based on the U.S. "binding commitment" test as enunciated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Gordon."s5
In fact, the test is particularly applicable to transactions which
span several years and thus are left open and uncertain for
longer periods of time. 6 For shorter periods of time within
a single tax year, "[tihe degree
of uncertainty that worried the
3 7
Gordon court is absent."1

White is at any rate justified under the requirements of the
less controversial U.S. "end result" and "interdependent"
tests.'38 Under the former, doubts exist as to whether all
the steps were components intended from the outset to achieve
the ultimate result,' because another option was just as
viable. The latter "interdependent" test was not fulfilled. This
may be obvious in that the first step of transfer to the Isle of
Man company was not fruitless in and of itself and could be
performed without
the carrying out of the entire
40
transaction.1

6.2. U.S. Case Law
In reviewing close U.S. cases, one can see a similarity to
the current judicial approach in the United Kingdom. For
instance, in the recent case of Associated Wholesale Groceries,
Inc. v. United States, 4 ' it was the taxpayer who tried to
avoid the non-recognition of gain or loss under section 332 of
the I.R.C. through a tax free liquidation of a subsidiary into a

White, [1988] 3 W.L.R. at 482.
'35 391 U.S. 83, 88 (1968); see also Associated Wholesale Groceries v.
United
States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991).
13
McDonald'sRestaurants, 688 F.2d at 525.
37
Id. at 525.
"3

138

See supra note 131.

18 For the test, see Section
140 See supra Section 5.

5 of the text.

141 927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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parent. In order to enjoy a current loss deduction, 1 4 the
taxpayer sold stock of a subsidiary to a third party and
immediately purchased most of the assets of the subsidiary.
The court ruled against the taxpayer on the basis of the steptransaction doctrine (its "interdependence test") and the fact
that the form of the transaction failed to obscure its real
substance. The purchase of the assets took place prior to the
liquidation of the subsidiary, and thus what the taxpayer
purported to present as two separate agreements was viewed
by the court as an integrated agreement and a composite
transaction. The court found that the taxpayer's behavior was
contrary to legislative intent, and, therefore, it had no effect on
the sale of the stock for taxation purposes.
Likewise, in McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v.
Commissioner,143 the court applied the step-transaction
doctrine at the request of McDonald's, which acquired a group
of restaurants from a third party in exchange for McDonald's
unregistered stock. The seller was interested in obtaining
cash, but the whole plan was arranged by McDonald's (the
buyer) in order to capitalize on a special accounting procedure.
In order to obtain the benefit of the accounting procedure, the
sellers merged into McDonald's, received their shares some
five months later when market conditions permitted,
registered the stock with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission ("S.E.C."), and then sold the stock immediately.
The McDonald'sRestaurantscourt first noted that the steptransaction doctrine "is a particular manifestation of the more
general tax law principle that purely formal distinctions
cannot obscure the substance of a transaction."'" The court
conceded the elusive character of the doctrine and of its
several tests, 1 45 but found that under any one of the tests

"a The court applied the pre-1986 version of § 332(b)(1), prior to its
amendment in 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1804(e)(6)(A) (1986).
'4
688 F.2d 520 (1982).
144
Id. at 524.
14 As noted in McDonald's Restaurants:

The commentators have attempted to synthesize from judicial
decisions several tests to determine whether the step transaction
doctrine is applicable to a particular set of circumstances ....
Unfortunately, these tests are notably abstruse-even for an
abstruse field [like] tax law.
McDonald's
688
F.2d at 2014
524 (quoting Redding v. Commissioner,
Published
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the transaction was stepped together. Thus, under the "end
result" test, all steps were taken to cash out the sellers, and it
was McDonald's who wanted to do so in such a way that
enabled it to utilize the desirable accounting procedures.
The second test, "the interdependent" test, concentrates on
the relationship among the steps rather than the end result.
Here, the merger would not have taken place without enabling
the sellers to sell McDonald's stock.
The "binding commitment" test, as noted earlier, was found
to be the most rigorous limitation on the step-transaction
doctrine. Similar to the White decision, 4 ' the court held
that the test was formulated to characterize transactions
which "spanned several tax years and could have remained
'not only indeterminable but unfixed for an indefinite and
unlimited period in the future, awaiting events that might or
might not happen.' "'47

In the given case, the court noted

that the transaction was completed in six months and within
the same tax year. The court held that the degree of
uncertainty discussed by the Gordon court was absent in this
case. It was enough that the sale of the sellers' McDonald's
stock was intended to take place within a relatively short
period of time, in order to satisfy "the spirit, if not the letter,
of the 'binding commitment' test." 48 This is exactly the
same conclusion drawn by the U.K. courts in Dawson and
White. Because the transaction in the McDonald'sRestaurants
case was in reality a straightforward sale of assets against
cash (marketable securities), McDonald's was allowed to treat
the transaction as a "pooling of interests" 49 with a steppedup basis in the assets acquired. A different result would have
been contradictory to the statutory intent of either the taxable
exchange provisions for outright taxable sales or the nonTherefore, the same
taxable reorganization provisions.'
630 F.2d at 1175).
146 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
147 McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 525 (quoting Gordon, 391 U.S.
at 96).
McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 525.
149 For an explanation of the accounting method, see id. at 521 n.2.
10 The term "reorganization" as used by the Code contemplates a
readjustment of the corporate structure of the business and not a mere
transitory holding or an insubstantial proprietary interest of shares. See id.
at 526. McDonald's Restaurants is a correct decision from the stephttps://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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step-transaction doctrine was successfully invoked by the
taxpayer in this particular instance.
In a few recent U.S. court decisions, the step-transaction
doctrine was ignored or expressly rejected under the factual
situations that are of concern here.
In Anderson v.
Commissioner,'5 ' the U.S. Tax Court accepted the form
selected by the taxpayer, in which his corporation made a taxfree distribution to him of certain assets, and the taxpayer sold
them several months after the beginning of the next tax year.
Income was correctly attributed to the taxpayer and not to his
corporation because, similar to the circumstances of the U.K.
White 52 case, the transaction was made by the individual
taxpayer and not by his corporation. Despite the fact that the
taxpayer controlled the corporation, an expectation of a taxfree transfer prior to the first step of immediate sale was not
sufficient to attribute the sale to the corporation when the
corporation did not participate in the final transaction. The
Tax Court in Anderson did not find the Court Holding.. case
applicable, and, as a consequence, did not explicitly discuss the
step-transaction doctrine. The assumption of the Court in
Anderson was that the taxpayer's decision was within the
elections the statute allowed him to make.
M the
Likewise, in Tandy Corporation v. Commissioner,"
Tax Court accepted the form chosen by the taxpayer where
Tandy transferred assets to newly-formed subsidiaries, and in
the following tax year spun off the stock of the subsidiaries to
its stockholders. The court refused to integrate all the steps
into a single transaction by which Tandy had directly

transaction analysis.

It is an odd decision which enabled taxpayers to

achieve their purpose, though it is not clear that it was compatiable with
the desirable policy of all the relevant provisions and accounting procedures.
The court simply forced the Commissioner to be consistent with the steptransaction theory whether or not the outcome is favorable to him or to the
taxpayer. The reorganization in this case was taxable because it did not
meet the "continuity of interest" requirement of section 1.368-1(b) of the
income tax regulations and the merging party has been taxed because of its
relatively prompt disposition. Consequently, the court did not allow the IRS
"to saddle the taxpayers with the disadvantageously low basis that goes
with the 'reorganization' label." McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 528.
92 T.C. 138 (1989).
152 [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423; see supra notes 116-34 and accompanying
text.

'r' 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
156
92 T.C.
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transferred the assets to its stockholders. The court decided
that the timing of the transaction had economic and business
purposes. Although it was a close case, it was a case highly
dependent upon its facts, and there is no reason to conclude
that it represents any departure from the longstanding legal
concepts.
Another recent U.S. case is Esmark v. Commissioner,"'5
in which the taxpayer intended to sell an appreciated
subsidiary (Vickers).
The Mobil Oil group agreed to
participate in a plan, initiated and carried out by their
investment bankers, in which Mobil made a successful cash
tender offer to Esmark's stockholders and acquired roughly
50% of the stock. As pre-planned, when the tender offer was
closed on the same day, Mobil Oil and Esmark completed the
redemption of the newly acquired Esmark stock in exchange
for the Vickers stock. In fact, Esmark substituted the tender
offer and redemption for the outright sale and redemption, and
Mobil's only purpose was the acquisition of Vickers stock in
exchange for Esmark's stock. The court confirmed a nonrecognition of gain or loss to Esmark, pursuant to the
distribution in redemption, which would not have been granted
if the stock had been sold for cash. The Tax Court decided
that each step of the transaction had permanent economic
effects, despite the fact that all steps were taken to enable the
sale by Esmark (the "end result" test). The court also decided
that all steps taken were interdependent, Mobil had only brief
transitory ownership of the Esmark stock, and the
transactions were carried out in order to create an outright
cash sale by Esmark of Vickers' stock followed by a
distribution of the sale proceeds to the stockholders. Under
the court's broad interpretation, even the "binding
commitment" test was met.' 56 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
without comment.
Although the Tax Court mentioned all of the steptransaction "tests," it did not find unnecessary steps that
should be ignored. It is hard to justify the Esmark decision.
It either represents a real departure from all tax avoidance
5'5
90 T.C. 171 (1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1989).
...See Section 5 of text; McDonald's Restaurants of Ill. v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 688 F.2d 520 (1982), and its discussion supra notes 14350 and accompanying text.
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doctrines, an erroneous interpretation by the court of the
relevant statute, or a case where step-transaction theory
should have been found applicable. Esmark appears to fall
within the U.K.'s Dawson... and the U.S.'s Associated
Wholesale Groceries5" and McDonald's Restaurants'59 line of
cases, but not within the U.K.'s White.6 or the U.S.'s
Anderson'6 ' or Tandy" 2 line of cases."
The parties
simply did not comply with the statutory intent of the relevant
non-recognition provision.
The court should have applied the general assignment of
income doctrine or the step-transaction theory in order to
attribute correctly the tax consequences of a cash sale of
Vickers stock and the diversion, by way of redemption of the
proceeds to its shareholders. The taxpayer in substance did
not qualify for nonrecognition under a rule that applied to
distribution in redemption, which is inapplicable to a sale of
stock for cash.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between elaborately
structured multi-step schemes which conform to the statutory
intent and are within the taxpayer's freedom of choice of form
and schemes that disguise the real transaction where tax
consequences should be attributed only to that transaction.
The distinctions, however, do exist and should be
acknowledged even in close cases, without introducing new tax
avoidance theories.'
Courts are sometimes misled when
the taxpayer adheres to the statutory form in order to achieve
his business purpose, but the particular form is not intended
to confer tax benefits to the transaction in which the taxpayer

167

Dawson, [1984] 2 W.L.R., at 226.

168 927 F.2d at 1517.
"19 688 F.2d at 520.
160 [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423. Any uncertainties at the time the first step was
taken were within the prearranged plan as set forth by Lord Jauncey; id. at
540-41; see also supra Section 6.1.1 of text.
161 92 T.C. at 138.

162 92 T.C. at 1165.
1,3 For a discussion

of the departure from the step-transaction doctrine,
see Robert W. Wood, supra note 52, at 301, but compare the analysis of
Esmark by Lee A. Sheppard, Esmark v. Commissioner: Of Form and
Substance andAesthetics, 38 TAX NOTES 1165 (1988).
164 For additional opinions in this area, see Brown, supra note 117;
Jensen,
supra
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engaged. The transaction falls outside of the taxpayer's
legitimate choice of form.
6.3. Israeli Cases and CorporateReorganization
The reluctance to introduce new tax avoidance theories also
reflects the policy of the Israeli courts. The Israeli courts have
had less experience in linear multi-step transactions than their
U.S. and U.K. counterparts. However, the Israeli Supreme
Court recently held6 5 inoperative an attempt by the
taxpayer corporation to channel what was in reality salaries
of its managing director and controlling shareholders, to a
related family owned corporation, as management fees. 6 In
return, that corporation distributed equivalent amounts to its
common controlling shareholder. This was clearly a step
transaction, but that doctrine had not yet been adopted by the
Israeli court. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Shamgar held that
the diversion of the funds to the related family corporation was
entirely artificial and engaged in for no business purpose
whatsoever. The goal of the transaction was to avoid an
employment tax, which during the relevant tax years was
imposed on salaries and not on management fees. Indeed, the
Israeli Grinbergcourt reached the correct conclusion where the
U.S. Esmark'
court erred (although admittedly, the
Esmark case involved a much more complex transaction-both
in its multiple form and in substance).
In a somewhat similar manner, the Israeli Supreme Court
combined two transactions into one for purchase tax
purposes."' In Taas Moor, Ltd. v. Director of Land
Appreciation Tax, 6 ' the issue was whether the costs of
constructing the building, structured as a transaction separate

165

Baruch Grinberg, Ltd. v. Assessing Officer, C.A. 495/88 46(2) P.D.

243.
An eligible "family company" is taxed according to the specific
statutory scheme outlined in § 64A of the Tax Ordinance which is somewhat
similar to U.S. taxation of S corporations (taxation does not occur both at
the corporate level and then again at the shareholder level, i.e. no double
taxation).
16 90 T.C. at 171.
168 Land Appreciation Tax Act of 1963, § 9. Section 9 taxes are imposed
on the buyer of real estate and include attached structures.
l11C.A. 390/80, 37(1) P.D. 449.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss1/2
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from the purchase of the land a short time earlier, were
subject to the purchase tax, or if the costs should be viewed as
an independent transaction not involving any purchase of land
rights and, therefore, not subject to the purchase tax. In other
words, the issue was whether to accept the two contracts, one
for the acquisition of the land and the second for the building
contract, as reflecting two independent transactions, or to treat
them as two steps of a single composite transaction (i.e., the
purchase of the land with the building).
Justice Shamgar was prepared to accept the two-step
transaction form chosen by the taxpayer. However, because
the separation into two transactions lacked any reasonable
economic or commercial purpose, Justice Shamgar held that it
was artificial and inoperative. Justices Ben-Porat and Or
reached the same conclusion, but by referring to the substance
of the transaction over its form. According to Justices BenPorat and Or, even if the division into two steps had a
business purpose, such as the taxpayer's alleged need to meet
the requirement of foreign exchange controls law, the true
substance was a single transaction, involving the acquisition
of land and the building to be constructed on it. Although the
U.S. terminology and exact tax avoidance doctrines were not
used, the essence of the reasoning and the ultimate results of
the Taas Moor court conform to the business purpose rule and
the form versus substance or step-transaction doctrines.
In this regard, the troublesome Israeli decision is TM.B.,
Ltd. v. Assessing Officer. 70 In this case the Treasury argued
the single coordinated transaction concept. However, because
the concept was not argued in the lower courts or at the
administrative appeal procedure level, the court refused to
apply it at such a later stage. Although the court insisted that
tax avoidance contentions should be argued on the basis of the
above-noted general provision of section 86 of the Tax
Ordinance (or its counterparts in other tax statutes),17 it
decided the issue on the basis of section 95 of the Israeli Tax
Ordinance, which was the Israeli counterpart of section 351 of
the United States Code. Section 95 was repealed as of
January 1, 1994.

170

C.A. 83/81, 40(3) P.D. 402.

'7 See supra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
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In TM.B. the taxpayer asserted that it was entitled to taxfree treatment for an exchange of capital assets for stock when
it had the required section 95 statutory control of at least 90%
of the voting stock for a month and a half following the
transfer. The language of the Tax Ordinance required that the
transferor of the property possess the necessary control
"immediately" following the transfer. The treatment of the
transfer turned on whether the "immediate" requirement was
met where, after a month and a half, the transferor lost
controlling interest of the company when the receiving
company issued 50% of all its stock to a third party in
exchange for cash. An additional significant factor was that
the entire plan was agreed upon, or at least practically
prearranged between all parties, when the first step was
taken.
The Israeli court quoted U.S. section 351 cases in support
of its conclusion that the statutory requirement of "immediate
control" was satisfied simply because the six weeks of control
following the transfer did not constitute "immediately."
Notwithstanding the procedural question of what arguments
could be heard on appeal,'7 2 the court in TM.B. reached an
erroneous conclusion. The proper interpretation of the statute
should have led to the opposite conclusion. The court should
have first analyzed the statutory intent of section 95 and held
that it was dependent on the continuity of interest theory.
The court then should have analyzed the findings of fact and
remanded the case to a lower court for further fact-finding if
necessary.
However, there were sufficient findings of fact to satisfy
even the "binding commitment" test within its U.S. Gordon
court meaning, 7 3 and its U.K. Ramsay 7 4-Dawson 5 White.. variation. 7
The U.S. "end result" test was
satisfied, as all steps were taken to allow the third party to
become an equal shareholder in the newly-formed taxpayer's
subsidiary, which received assets in exchange for stock. In
172

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.

173 391 U.S. 83; see notes 91, 146-48 and accompanying text.
174 [1981] 2 W.L.R. at 449.
176

[1984] 2 W.L.R. at 226.
[1988] 3 W.L.R. 423.

17

See supra notes 124-28, 130 and accompanying text.
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addition, the U.S. "interdependent" test was also satisfied
because it appeared as the first step in forming the subsidiary,
and the transfer of assets in exchange for stock would not have
taken place without the prearranged plan to issue 50% of the
stock to the third party in exchange for cash. Only if the final
transactions were not concluded when the first exchange took
place or at least were uncertain with respect to their principal
terms, as the U.K. Court pronounced in White,' would
these tests have supported the final conclusion of the Israeli
7
Court in TM.B."'
The TM.B. case, and decisions following its reasoning, can
only be justified when all the integral transactions, taken into
consideration as a single transaction, are compatible with the
statutory intent of section 95 of the Tax Ordinance. If the
transactions are compatible with section 95, it is irrelevant
whether there is a tax minimization plan, or a tax avoidance
plan.
The impetus for section 95's 90% control requirement,
immediately following the exchange, or the U.S. section 351
80% control requirement, is found in the legislature's desire to
accord non-recognition treatment to mere changes of a
taxpayer's form of operation in order to facilitate business
readjustments. The mere change of form rationale requires
non-recognition treatment whenever the transferor assumes in
advance the required control. The same result is achieved
pursuant to the similar, but not identical, theory of mere
change of form facilitating necessary desirable business
readjustments, without a change of control.' ° Under these
theories, section 351 accords non-recognition treatment to
mere changes of form as opposed to exchanges which are the
equivalent of disposals or sales.'
The current approach in the United States is that the
statutory requirement of sections 351 and 368(c) of the I.R.C.
is not satisfied if the transferor of the property agreed, when

178

text.

[1988] 3 W.L.R. 423; see also supra notes 116-40 and accompanying
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C.A. 83/81, 40(3) P.D. 402.
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For an analysis of the § 351 rationale, see Jensen, supra note 8, at

375, 387-88 n.388.
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the steps were taken, to transfer stock to a third party and
consequently lose its controlling interest. The requirements
are also not satisfied if such a transfer is an integral part of
the plan of incorporation."l 2 Loss of control under section
368(c) would be treated the same under the above steptransaction doctrine"a as it would be treated under section
351."M
Interestingly, it is the same step-transaction theory'8
which could enable taxpayers to consolidate several steps to
fulfill the control "immediately" following the entire series of
8 6 Thus, the necessary control is not
exchange requirement."
being achieved simultaneously by all taxpayers and exchanges.
Pursuant to this theory, there is no taxable exchange if any
additional funds or property exchanged for future stock
interests, according to prior commitment or prearrangement at
the time of the first exchange, are preserved with the
corporation. Such a theory could meet the statutory intent of
section 95 of the Israeli Ordinance or section 351 of the I.R.C.,
because they resemble the mere change of form of nontaxable
exchanges. However, taxable exchanges can occur when there
is a loss of control subsequent to an exchange or disposal at
the shareholder level, i.e., shareholder A sells all or part of his
controlling shares to shareholder B.
The T.M.B. case was not decided in favor of the taxpayer
on the basis of the latter advanced theory, which gave
preference to substance (integrated transactions) over form,
when such substance was compatible with the statutory intent.
Rather, TM.B. was decided erroneously by ignoring the
substance of the two-step transaction. The Israeli court could
have decided the case in favor of the taxpayer, if the
substance, i.e., the single economic transaction, would have
met the statutory intent of section 95, which in fact it did not.
Indeed, Justice Bach in the TM.B. case engaged in this

182 BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF

CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 3.09 at 3-31 (5th ed. 1993 Supp.).
18

See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.

184

See Jensen, supra note 8.

See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text; see also McDonald's
Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 520.
188 BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 182, at 3-31; Treas. Reg. 1.351-1(a)(1)
18

(1976).
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analysis in another context when he clearly addressed the
substance of the transaction. 8 ' Such an approach is in full
accordance with the U.S. courts.' 88
In conclusion, other than the possible support for the
outcome of the T.M.B. case, its line of reasoning is
incompatible with the U.S. Gregory case"' and its progeny,
the U.K. Ramsay9 0 -Dawson l-White 92 doctrines.
Multiple transactions should be respected because each
transaction and all the transactions, taken into consideration
as a series of related transactions, are compatible with the
statutory intent of section 95 of the Israeli Tax Ordinance and
section 351 of the I.R.C. 93
Offir v. Director of Land Appreciation Tax, C/A 552/82,42(3) P.D. 508.
Cf. Bird v. Inland Revenue Comm'rs [1987] S.T.C. 168. There is a question
as to whether the approach taken by the Bird court is fully compatible with
Lord Keith's passage in White quoted supra note 84.
188 McDonald's Restaurants, 688 F.2d at 520. For a discussion of
McDonald's see supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text. Nonetheless,
the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS") approved § 351 nonrecognition
treatment when a shareholder transferred his business assets to a newlyformed corporation in exchange for 20% of its stock, with the remaining 80%
being issued to a professional underwriter for cash. Under the plan, the
underwriter intended to sell all his shares to the public. The IRS ignored
the underwriter's transitory ownership of stock and granted nonrecognition
when he acquired the stock. Rev. Rul. 78-294, 1978-2 C.B. 141; Jensen,
supra note 8, at 357-58. Thus, the IRS has deviated from the general steptransaction doctrine in the §§ 351, 368(a)(1)(D) cases. Id. at 359-68.
187

189 69 F.2d at 809
19o [1981] 2 W.L.R. at 449.
191

[1984] 2 W.L.R. at 226.

192 [1988] 3 W.L.R. 423.
193 The step-transaction

doctrine should not be invoked and the court was
correct only if at the time of the first step of transfer of property there was
no arrangement for the later issue of more than 10% of the stock (20% under
U.S. law) to an outsider party, within the meaning of White. It should be
noted that, effective January 1, 1994, the Israeli section 95 was replaced by
a new detailed statutory arrangement for corporate reorganization,
including mergers, spin-offs and transfer of assets against shares:
Amendment to the Income Tax Ordinance (No. 94) of 1993 (Book of Statutes
190) [In Hebrew: Sefer Hahukin, p. 190].
Under the new law, the non-recognition treatment is conditional on the
retainment of 90% control, of the transferror of assets against shares, for at
least two years following the exchange, subject to several exceptions (Section
104A of the Ordinance). Consequently, the old requirement of "immediate"
control was generally replaced by a two-year requirement of control.
Nevertheless, the TM.B. issue is still relevant under the new law. For
section 104A(a)(3)
requires that the fair market value of
example,
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7. CONCLUSION

This comparative analysis of the U.S., U.K. and Israeli tax
systems has demonstrated that, although the terminology of
precise tax avoidance doctrines is not identical, the legal
systems share similar tax principles particularly in regard to
linear transactions. The following passage by Lord Goff fully
applies to the three systems:
We can see from this broad principle [of Ramsay'"Burmah9 5 -Dawson9 6 I that a distinction has to be
drawn between a composite transaction of that kind,
and a series of independent transactions of which the
first constitutes a step taken to prepare for the
avoidance of tax, such avoidance being achieved by
later, independent, steps. It is that latter type of
scheme which is usually known as strategic tax
planning, which must be distinguished from
unacceptable tax avoidance caught by the Ramsay
principle. So understood, the Ramsay principle can be
identified as not merely consistent with the statute, but
as achieving a result which is sensible in terms of
1 97
policy.
A clear tax avoidance scheme is inoperative for tax
purposes in all three systems. It is a mistake to consider the
U.S. tests for step transactions as part of the normative U.S.
law of tax avoidance. The tests simply serve as judicial
guidelines, usually in order to resolve complex issues of multistep transactions. The question becomes whether to treat the
transactions as a single composite transaction or as several
independent ones, and even while treating all steps as a
composite transaction, does it achieve a legitimate business
purpose? The final result of the analysis is the determination
of whether the transactions fall within the statutory intent of

the share issued to the transferor of the assets relative to the value of all
outstanding stock of the company "immediately" following their issue, be
identical to the value of the exchanged assets relative to the value of all
corporate assets.
194 [1981] 2 W.L.R. at 449.
195 1982 S.T.C. at 30.
19"

[1984] 2 W.L.R. at 226.

[1988] 3 W.L.R. at 469.
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the applicable statutory provisions.
This analysis is in fact derived from common sense and
logical considerations. Such considerations should also include
the relative ease of administering the tax system. Therefore,
cases and commentaries to the contrary should be rejected.
The step transaction doctrine is a variation of the general tax
avoidance and attribution of income doctrines, and if the
correct decision can be reached by invoking one of the general
doctrines, there is no need to apply the step transaction
theory. U.K. law has moved along the preferable path as
evidenced by the Ramsay new approach (as extended in the
Burmah and Dawson cases), but the relevant tax policy needs
refinement in order to formulate better guidelines for close
cases. Thus, decisions such as White would not surprise
members of the tax bar. It should be clear, however, that
neither Ramsay nor Dawson set forth any new tax theories
which negate an otherwise legitimate choice of form allowed by
statute.
Thus, the criterion set forth in White is not the certainty of
the economic composite transaction being completed, but
whether the original taxpayer completed the entire transaction
or whether there was another transaction completed by
another person independent enough to be accepted by the
courts. This should also be the criterion under both the U.S.
and Israeli tax systems.
Israeli law generally has adopted the necessary doctrines
in order to combat tax avoidance, but lacks any guidelines for
complex cases, such as those which are presented in the
multiple transaction area. It is this shortcoming which
culminated in the erroneous decision of TM.B. The court even
ignored one common sense guideline that was expressly
admitted by the U.S. and U.K. courts: that a prearranged or
preordained series of steps is usually equal to steps which
follow a binding contract for tax purposes.
The proper guidelines should be flexible enough to
accommodate difficult cases, but at the same time afford
enough certainty and predictability of results in the tax
planning area for the benefit of the business community and
its tax advisors. In this context the length of time between
each step is also relevant. Although it is not a tax norm, a
relatively long time between each step cures an otherwise
"fatal" series of multiple transactions.
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